Mind and choice in economics
This paper holds that the criteria of rational behavior, so far assumed in behavioral models, are not dufficiently realistic. The point of view here presented lies upon contemporary neurobiology that teaches how individual behavior responds to more complex and efficient criteria than the ones so far utilized in the decision making models. Following Simon's and Hayek's institutions, the paper takes the view that knowledge is the fruit of a process of "endogenous construction" and that perception represents the source of the unpredictability of behavior, and the cornerston of economic change. A relevant part of contemporary neurobiology has later confirmed these intuitions, and it can probably help us understand the role of emotions in the processes of choice. The development of this approach may have an influence on economic theory, especially with reference to economic behavior, theory of games, procedural rationality models, and pathdependent processes.
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