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Prepayment Penalties: Efficieny and Predation

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Abstract

This paper presents evidence that reductions in mortgage interest rates associated with prepayment penalties are greater for riskier borrowers, as measured by mortgage type, credit scores, and local incomes and education levels. This is consistent with an efficiency view that, by reducing the reclassification risk faced by lenders, prepayment penalties can be welfare-improving. Additional findings indicate that prepayment penalties are also used as a predatory lending tool, but that the efficiency view dominates the predatory view in most circumstances. State anti-predatory lending laws restricting the duration and amount of prepayment penalties appear to curb the predatory use of prepayment penalties.

Suggested Citation

  • Morgan J. Rose, 2011. "Prepayment Penalties: Efficieny and Predation," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 11-133, UMBC Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:umb:econwp:11133
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    prepayment penalties; predatory lending; financial regulation; mortgage crisis; reclassification risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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