IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers

  • Christopher J. Mayer
  • Tomasz Piskorski
  • Alexei Tchistyi

This paper explores the practice of mortgage refinancing in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. We show that prepayment penalties improve welfare by ensuring longer-term lending contracts, which prevents the mortgage pools from becoming disproportionately composed of the riskiest borrowers over time. Mortgages with prepayment penalties allow lenders to lower mortgage rates and extend credit to the least creditworthy, with the largest benefits going to the riskiest borrowers, who have the most incentive to refinance in response to positive credit shocks. Empirical evidence from more than 21,000 non-agency securitized fixed rate mortgages is consistent with the key predictions of our model. Our results suggest that regulations banning refinancing penalties might have the unintended consequence of restricting access to credit and raising rates for the least creditworthy borrowers.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16586.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 16586.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Mayer, Christopher, Tomasz Pisk orski, and Alexei Tchistyi. 2013 . “The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good f or Risky Borro wers.” Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 107(2), 694 - 714.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16586
Note: AP PE
Contact details of provider: Postal:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.

Phone: 617-868-3900
Web page: http://www.nber.org
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Yacine Aït-Sahalia & Jonathan A. Parker & Motohiro Yogo, 2004. "Luxury Goods and the Equity Premium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2959-3004, December.
  2. LeRoy, Stephen F, 1996. "Mortgage Valuation under Optimal Prepayment," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 817-44.
  3. Matthew Spiegel, 2001. "Housing Return and Construction Cycles," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 521-551.
  4. Ralph S.J Koijen & Otto Van Hemert & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2007. "Mortgage Timing," NBER Working Papers 13361, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Spiegel, Matthew & Strange, William, 1992. "A Theory of Predictable Excess Returns in Real Estate," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 375-92, December.
  6. John Y. Campbell & Joao F. Cocco, 2004. "How Do House Prices Affect Consumption? Evidence From Micro F. Data," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2045, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  7. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
  8. Sven Rady, 2001. "Housing Market Dynamics: on the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit Constraints," FMG Discussion Papers dp375, Financial Markets Group.
  9. Stanton, Richard, 1995. "Rational Prepayment and the Valuation Mortgage-Backed Securities," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 677-708.
  10. Matthew Spiegel, 1999. "Housing Return And Construction Cycles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm114, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
  11. Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2003. "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 299-328.
  12. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, 1998. "Mortgage Choice: What's the Point?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 173-205.
  13. Schwartz, Eduardo S & Torous, Walter N, 1989. " Prepayment and the Valuation of Mortgage-Backed Securities," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 375-92, June.
  14. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-443.
  15. Vikrant Vig & Amit Seru & Tomasz Piskorski, 2009. "Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," 2009 Meeting Papers 1169, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  16. Dunn, Kenneth B & Spatt, Chester S, 1985. " An Analysis of Mortgage Contracting: Prepayment Penalties and the Due-on-Sale Clause," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 293-308, March.
  17. Gustavo Manso & Bruno Strulovici & Alexei Tchistyi, 2010. "Performance-Sensitive Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 1819-1854.
  18. Kau, James B, et al, 1992. "A Generalized Valuation Model for Fixed-Rate Residential Mortgages," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(3), pages 279-99, August.
  19. Christopher J. Mayer & Karen M. Pence & Shane M. Sherlund, 2008. "The rise in mortgage defaults," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-59, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  20. Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1989. " Adverse Selection in a Model of Real Estate Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(2), pages 499-508, June.
  21. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1449-1496.
  22. Cochrane, John H, 1995. "Time-Consistent Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 445-73, June.
  23. Findlay, M Chapman, III & Capozza, Dennis R, 1977. "The Variable-Rate Mortgage and Risk in the Mortgage Market: An Option Theory Perspective: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 356-64, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16586. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.