A Theory Of Predictable Excess Returns In Real Estate
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Other versions of this item:
- Spiegel, Matthew & Strange, William, 1992. "A Theory of Predictable Excess Returns in Real Estate," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 375-392, December.
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- Spiegel, Matthew, 1999. "Housing Return and Construction Cycles," Research Program in Finance, Working Paper Series qt8647j8gq, Research Program in Finance, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Mayer, Chris & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2013. "The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 694-714.
- William Goetzmann & Matthew Spiegel, 2000. "The Policy Implications of Portfolio Choice in Underserved Mortgage Markets," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm161, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
- Daniel, Kent & Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2002. "Investor psychology in capital markets: evidence and policy implications," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 139-209, January.
- Matthew Spiegel, 1999. "Housing Return And Construction Cycles," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm114, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
- Dietz, Robert D. & Haurin, Donald R., 2003. "The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 401-450, November.
- Christopher J. Mayer & Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei Tchistyi, 2010. "The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers," NBER Working Papers 16586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Keywordsbanks ; moral hazard ; consumers ; money ; loans;
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