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Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties, and Default

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  • Morgan J. Rose

    () (UMBC)

Abstract

This paper presents evidence that non-bank-originated subprime mortgages have a higher probability of default than bank-originated subprime mortgages, but only for loans with prepayment penalties. Evidence also indicates that non-banks price prepayment penalties less favorably to borrowers than banks do, and non-banks originate disproportionately more loans with prepayment penalties in locales with less financially sophisticated borrowers. State anti-predatory lending law provisions restricting the use of prepayment penalties eliminate the elevated default risk of non-bank originations relative to bank originations. These findings are consistent with incentives generated by non-bank compensation via yield spread premiums on loans with prepayment penalties.

Suggested Citation

  • Morgan J. Rose, 2010. "Origination Channel, Prepayment Penalties, and Default," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 10-124, UMBC Department of Economics, revised 01 Jul 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:umb:econwp:10124
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    File URL: http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_10_124.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, 2010. "The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed-Rate Mortgages," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 38(3), pages 399-426.
    2. Anthony Pennington-Cross & Giang Ho, 2008. "Predatory Lending Laws and the Cost of Credit," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 36(2), pages 175-211, June.
    3. Ho, Giang & Pennington-Cross, Anthony, 2006. "The impact of local predatory lending laws on the flow of subprime credit," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 210-228, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:jbfina:v:82:y:2017:i:c:p:165-179 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Beltratti, Andrea & Benetton, Matteo & Gavazza, Alessandro, 2017. "The role of prepayment penalties in mortgage loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 165-179.
    3. Morgan J. Rose, 2011. "Prepayment Penalties: Efficieny and Predation," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 11-133, UMBC Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    foreclosure; prepayment penalties; mortgage brokers; financial regulation; anti-predatory lending laws.;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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