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Inter-Organizational Accountability and Budget Cut-Backs

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  • Enrico Bracci

Abstract

Accountability arrangements in networks present special concerns because of the potential for accountability to get "lost in the cracks of horizontal and hybrid governance" (Romzek et al 2012:443). Networks involve numerous cooperating agencies and/or subcontractors with different goals, organizational agendas (Romzek et al 2012). The aim of the present paper is to investigate, through an exploratory case study, how accountability is shaped in a network of public and private actors and the set of means and processes adopted, in a period of budget cut-backs due to the financial constraints in the public sector. The paper, drawing from the accountability literature (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987; Romzek et al., 2012), presents the result of a field study in a social services network in Italy. Data are based on document analysis, interviews with key institutional actors and participation in budgetary negotiation meeting in the network.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrico Bracci, 2013. "Inter-Organizational Accountability and Budget Cut-Backs," Working Papers 2013152, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:udf:wpaper:2013152
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bracci, Enrico, 2009. "Autonomy, responsibility and accountability in the Italian school system," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 293-312.
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    5. Enrico Bracci & Sue Llewellyn, 2012. "Accounting and accountability in an Italian social care provider: Contrasting people-changing with people-processing approaches," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 25(5), pages 806-834, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    austerity; accountability; social care; network;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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