Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games
This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
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Web page: http://www.unibs.it/atp/page.1019.0.0.0.atp?node=224
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- Klaus Abbink & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Shmuel Zamir, 2004.
"Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 25-57, 08.
- Abbink, K. & Sadrieh, A. & Zamir, S., 2002. "Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior," Discussion Paper 2002-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental 0504003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2005.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Rankin, Frederick W., 2003. "Communication in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 267-271, November.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 668, Stockholm School of Economics.
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