Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games
We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
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- Klaus Abbink & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Shmuel Zamir, 2004.
"Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 25-57, 08.
- Abbink, K. & Sadrieh, A. & Zamir, S., 2002. "Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior," Discussion Paper 2002-38, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Rankin, Frederick W., 2003. "Communication in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 267-271, November.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 668, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental 0504003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2005. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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