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Expressing Emotion and Fairness Crowding-out in an Ultimatum Game with Incomplete Information

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  • Chen, Josie I
  • Kamei, Kenju

Abstract

Recent experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers are more generous in accepting unfair offers made by sellers. It has also shown that sellers make fairer decisions when they are rated, while some studies show that they are little affected by the rating systems. These studies are conducted under complete information settings. However, asymmetric information about the values of traded commodities between sellers and buyers may change their perception of fairness and thus may change sellers’ decisions. We conduct ultimatum game experiments in which only the sellers are informed of the size of pies. We find that when rating systems are available to the buyers, the buyers become more amenable to potentially unfair offers. We also find that sellers attempt to sell the commodity at higher prices, taking advantage of the buyers’ openness to potentially unfair offers, contrary to the past studies with complete information.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Josie I & Kamei, Kenju, 2014. "Expressing Emotion and Fairness Crowding-out in an Ultimatum Game with Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 54405, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:54405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kamei, Kenju, 2014. "Promoting Competition or Helping Less-Endowed? An Experiment on Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality," MPRA Paper 56774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Samahita, Margaret, 2017. "Venting and gossiping in conflicts: Verbal expression in ultimatum games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 111-121.
    3. Samahita, Margaret, 2015. "Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games," Working Papers 2015:33, Lund University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experiments; Ultimatum Game; Incomplete Information; Emotion; Rating; Social Approval; Social Disapproval;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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