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Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Author

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  • Mario Capizzani
  • Luigi Mittone

    ()

  • Andrew Musau
  • Antonino Vaccaro

Abstract

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. Xiao and Houser (2009), and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), find that when the allocator donates an amount to a recipient, and the recipient sends an anonymous written message after learning of the amount, donations are higher in relation to the standard (no-communication) condition. We experimentally investigate whether strategic considerations crowd out anticipatory effects of communication in an ultimatum game, and find that such effects still persist in the pres- ence of two-sided communication.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Capizzani & Luigi Mittone & Andrew Musau & Antonino Vaccaro, 2016. "Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game," CEEL Working Papers 1602, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:1602
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andersson, Ola & Galizzi, Matteo M. & Hoppe, Tim & Kranz, Sebastian & der Wiel, Karen van & Wengström, Erik, 2010. "Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 16-18, July.
    2. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
    3. Xiao, Erte & Houser, Daniel, 2009. "Avoiding the sharp tongue: Anticipated written messages promote fair economic exchange," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 393-404, June.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    5. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    6. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
    7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2013. "Deception: The role of guilt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 227-232.
    8. Brook, Rebecca & Servátka, Maroš, 2016. "The anticipatory effect of nonverbal communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 45-48.
    9. Zultan, Ro’i, 2012. "Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 425-434.
    10. Andreoni, James & Rao, Justin M., 2011. "The power of asking: How communication affects selfishness, empathy, and altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 513-520.
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    12. Hessel Oosterbeek & Randolph Sloof & Gijs van de Kuilen, 2004. "Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 7(2), pages 171-188, June.
    13. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 668, Stockholm School of Economics.
    14. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri, 2008. "What's in a name? Anonymity and social distance in dictator and ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-35, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Faillo & Federico Fornasari & Luigi Mittone, 2016. "Tell Me How to Rule: Leadership, Delegation, and Voice in Cooperation," CEEL Working Papers 1604, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    2. Feicht, Robert & Grimm, Veronika & Rau, Holger A. & Stephan, Gesine, 2017. "On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 175-192.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ultimatum game; anticipated communication; experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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