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The effect and risks of ECB collateral framework changes

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  • Christophe Blot

    (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques)

  • Jérôme Creel

    (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques)

  • Paul Hubert

    (Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques)

Abstract

During the crisis, the ECB modified its collateral framework to face increased liquidity needs of commercial banks. This has taken two forms: the minimum required rating for different classes of assets has been reduced and the haircut associated to these assets has evolved conditional on the default risks of these assets. The benefits in terms of cushioning a liquidity crisis and enhancing monetary policy transmission have most probably exceeded the costs in terms of riskier central bank balance sheet and potential capital losses. This document was provided by Policy Department A at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee.

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  • Christophe Blot & Jérôme Creel & Paul Hubert, 2018. "The effect and risks of ECB collateral framework changes," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4hi059h9n59, Sciences Po.
    • Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4hi059h9n59cr91qdfgmoo2o3c
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Kaldorf & Florian Wicknig, 2021. "Risky Financial Collateral, Firm Heterogeneity, and the Impact of Eligibility Requirements," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 123, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

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