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The Making of France

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This paper studies nation-building in a fragmented society. We document the political economy of mass education, the adoption of a common language, and the construction of a national identity in France. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that statesponsored education led to linguistic homogenization. To understand why nation-building was successful, we study heterogeneity and find that knowledge elites and the demand for education were instrumental.

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  • Guillaume Blanc and Masahiro Kubo, 2026. "The Making of France," Discussion Papers dp26-04, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    • Handle: RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp26-04
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