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Tribal Art Market. Signs and Signals

Author

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  • Guido Candela

    () (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy)

  • Massimiliano Castellani

    () (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy)

  • Pierpaolo Pattitoni

    () (Department of Management, Faculty of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a model for the marketability of a Tribal artwork and we test this model empirically using a unique hand-collected dataset, which comprises the worldwide Tribal art market auctions between 1999 and 2008. Our results show a significant relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold and several signs and signals. The effect of the auction estimated prices on the probability of sales is nonlinear, and allows us to divide the Tribal art market into two price regimes. In the low-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is negative. In the high-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is positive.

Suggested Citation

  • Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni, 2011. "Tribal Art Market. Signs and Signals," Working Paper series 02_11, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Feb 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:02_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:kap:jculte:v:42:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10824-016-9279-4 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bertacchini, Enrico & Friel, Martha, 2014. "Determining the Value of Modern and Contemporary Furniture Design: an Exploratory Investigation," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201437, University of Turin.
    3. Massimiliano Castellani & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Antonello Eugenio Scorcu, 2012. "Visual artist price heterogeneity," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 1(3), pages 16-22.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tribal art; Signs; Signals; Veblen effect; Conspicuous consumption;

    JEL classification:

    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities

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