Tribal Art Market. Signs and Signals
In this paper, we present a model for the marketability of a Tribal artwork and we test this model empirically using a unique hand-collected dataset, which comprises the worldwide Tribal art market auctions between 1999 and 2008. Our results show a significant relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold and several signs and signals. The effect of the auction estimated prices on the probability of sales is nonlinear, and allows us to divide the Tribal art market into two price regimes. In the low-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is negative. In the high-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is positive.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via Patara, 3, 47921 Rimini (RN)|
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