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Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game

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  • Angelini, Francesco
  • Castellani, Massimiliano

Abstract

In this paper, we model private art market agents’ strategic interactions in presence of two types of asymmetric information, about artwork quality and buyer’s knowledge, assuming the seller does not know how informed is the buyer while the buyer does not know the quality of the artwork before purchase. If the seller can choose either a high or a low price and the buyer can signal his type to the seller, we identify the conditions for both equilibria with pooling buyer signalling strategy and with separating strategy, as well as conditions for equilibria where the seller fixes the price according to the actual quality and where he posts prices trying to take advantage of buyer’s limited information. Finally, we identify the condition for the emergence of a “counter-lemon” result, where low-quality artworks and uninformed collectors exit the market, suggesting that seller uncertainty does not directly benefit the buyers, but it can impact the quality traded in the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Angelini, Francesco & Castellani, Massimiliano, 2022. "Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 14-20.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:76:y:2022:i:1:p:14-20
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2022.01.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhong, Bin & Soh, Wei Ni & Ong, Tze San & Muhamad, Haslinah & He, ChunXi, 2024. "Analysis of the impact of managers' psychological deviation on information disclosure and irrational overseas investment after IFRS convergence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2022. "Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 39(3), pages 961-988, October.
    3. Lee, Boram & Fraser, Ian & Fillis, Ian, 2022. "To sell or not to sell? Pricing strategies of newly-graduated artists," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 595-604.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Art pricing; Asymmetric information; Signalling; Disclosure; Quality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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