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Shared quality uncertainty and the introduction of indeterminate goods

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  • Sylvie Lupton

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new category of goods, 'indeterminate goods', which will be compared with the classical framework of experience, search and credence goods (Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni, 1973). This concept sheds new light on the nature and status of quality uncertainty through the following hypothesis: uncertainty about the product's quality can be shared by all agents of the market, and this uncertainty can be non-neutral and disrupt the market. We identify three types of shared uncertainty about the product's characteristics and the corresponding problems that can arise: shared uncertainty due to the emergence of a product (Hirschman, 1974), shared uncertainty concerning the past of a product (basing ourselves on the art market), and finally shared uncertainty regarding the future impacts of a product, through empirical data on product safety. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Lupton, 2005. "Shared quality uncertainty and the introduction of indeterminate goods," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 29(3), pages 399-421, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:29:y:2005:i:3:p:399-421
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cje/bei009
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani, 2018. "Private pricing in the art market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2371-2378.
    2. Erwan Queinnec, 2011. "Do Not-For-Profit Organizations Meet A Demand For Trust Goods ? A Reappraisal Of The Contract Failure Theory [Resoudre Un Probleme D’Asymetrie D’Information En S’Abstenant De Faire Du Profit : Les ," Working Papers hal-01367931, HAL.
    3. Anne-Sophie V. Radermecker & Koenraad Brosens, 2023. "Valuing European tapestry: from riches to rags," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 47(3), pages 359-406, September.
    4. Kim Oosterlinck & Anne-Sophie Radermecker, 2019. "“The Master of …”: creating names for art history and the art market," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 43(1), pages 57-95, March.
    5. Gaëlle Balineau & Ivan Dufeu, 2010. "Are Fair Trade Goods Credence Goods? A New Proposal, with French Illustrations," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 331-345, April.
    6. Elena Fourcroy & Sylvie Lupton & Ion Lucian Ceapraz, 2021. "The circular economy in action: the case of digestate markets [L'économie circulaire en action : le cas des marchés des digestats]," Post-Print hal-04369253, HAL.
    7. Angelini, Francesco & Castellani, Massimiliano, 2022. "Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 14-20.
    8. Anne-Sophie Radermecker & Koenraad Brosens, 2023. "Valuing European tapestry: from riches to rags," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/371370, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Lupton, Sylvie, 2006. "Il était une fois la qualité," MPRA Paper 5, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Jaekwon Chung, 2020. "Effect of Quality Uncertainty, Regulatory Focus, and Promotional Strategies on Perceived Savings for Sustainable Marketing," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(14), pages 1-16, July.
    11. Nicholas Dew & Saras Sarasvathy, 2007. "Innovations, Stakeholders & Entrepreneurship," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 267-283, September.
    12. Anne-Sophie V. E. Radermecker, 2019. "Artworks without names: an insight into the market for anonymous paintings," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 43(3), pages 443-483, September.
    13. Evrim Dener, 2011. "Quality uncertainty and time inconsistency in a durable good market," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 1-24, September.
    14. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2022. "Overconfidence in the art market: a bargaining pricing model with asymmetric disinformation," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 39(3), pages 961-988, October.
    15. Benjamin Huybrechts & Darryl Reed, 2010. "Introduction: “Fair Trade in Different National Contexts”," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 147-150, April.
    16. Ramo Barrena & Mercedes Sánchez, 2011. "Abstraction and product categories as explanatory variables for food consumption," Post-Print hal-00712382, HAL.
    17. Gaëlle Balineau & Ivan Dufeu, 2010. "Are Fair Trade Goods Credence Goods? A New Proposal, with French Illustrations [Les produits du Commerce Equitable sont-ils des biens de croyance ?]," Post-Print hal-02814413, HAL.
    18. Gaëlle Balineau & Ivan Dufeu, 2012. "The credibility of the Fairtrade system [Le système Fairtrade : une garantie pour les consommateurs ?]," Post-Print hal-02794962, HAL.
    19. Chloé Tankam & Dominique Vollet & Olivier Aznar, 2019. "Between information asymmetry and shared uncertainty, an analysis of organic certification systems for the Kenyan domestic market [Entre asymétrie d'information et incertitude partagée analyse des ," Post-Print hal-02534461, HAL.
    20. Kim Oosterlinck & Anne-Sophie Radermecker, 2021. "Regulation or Reputation? Evidence from the Art Market," Working Papers CEB 21-006, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    21. Erwan Queinnec, 2011. "Do Not-For-Profit Organizations Meet A Demand For Trust Goods ? A Reappraisal Of The Contract Failure Theory [Resoudre Un Probleme D’Asymetrie D’Information En S’Abstenant De Faire Du Profit : Les ," CEPN Working Papers hal-01367931, HAL.

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