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Sophisticated Intermediation and Aggregate Volatility

  • Luigi Iovino

    (MIT)

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    I consider an economy where investors delegate their investment decisions to financial institutions that choose across multiple investment opportunities featuring different levels of idiosyncratic risk and different degrees of correlation with the aggregate of the economy. Investors solve an optimal contracting problem to induce financial institutions to allocate their investment optimally. I then study how investment decisions are affected when financial securities are introduced that allow agents to trade their risks. Investors do not have the necessary information to understand these securities, but give incentives to financial institutions to hedge certain risks. I show that hedging idiosyncratic risks ameliorates the agency problem between investors and financial institutions and reduces aggregate volatility. On the contrary, when aggregate risk can be hedged the agency problem worsens and aggregate volatility increases. Finally, I study the efficiency properties of the equilibrium and the potential role for financial regulation.

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    File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_965.pdf
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    Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2012 Meeting Papers with number 965.

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    Date of creation: 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:red:sed012:965
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA

    Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/
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