Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
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- Koeppl, Thorsten V., 2007. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 34-60, May.
- Koeppl, Thorsten Volker, 2003. "Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable," Working Paper Series 282, European Central Bank.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Latchezar Popov, 2014. "Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 195-222, September.
- Koppl, Thorsten V., 2006.
"Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1987-2014, November.
- Thorsten Koeppl, 2004. "Risk Sharing through Financial Markets with Endogenous Enforcement of Trades," Working Papers 1048, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Koeppl, Thorsten Volker, 2004. "Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades," Working Paper Series 319, European Central Bank.
- Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2004. "Risk Sharing through Financial Markets with Endogenous Enforcement of Trades," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 326, Econometric Society.
- Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
- Jonathan Pogach, 2010. "Efficient Auditing and Enforcement in Dynamic Contracts," 2010 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Camera, Gabriele & Gioffré, Alessandro, 2014.
"Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 51-63.
- Camera, Gabriele & Gioffré, Alessandro, 2013. "Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium," SAFE Working Paper Series 32, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
- Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015.
"Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
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"Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt,"
Economic Theory,
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"Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution,"
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- Thor Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2007.
"The Poor, the Rich and the Enforcer: Institutional Choice and Growth,"
Working Papers
1150, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Erwan Quintin & Cyril Monnet & Thorsten Koeppl, 2008. "The Poor, the Rich and the Enforcer: Institutional Choice and Growth," 2008 Meeting Papers 281, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Erwan Quintin & Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet, 2008. "The poor, the rich and the enforcer: institutional choice and growth," Working Papers 0801, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2013. "Consumer Default with Complete Markets: Default-based Pricing and Finite Punishment," Working Papers 711, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Xiao, Tiaojun & Yang, Danqin, 2009. "Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(3), pages 1076-1085, August.
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- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.
More about this item
Keywords
Limited Commitment; Risk Sharing; Third-party Enforcement;JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2006-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2006-03-25 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-DGE-2006-03-25 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-IAS-2006-03-25 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2006-03-25 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2006-03-25 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2006-03-25 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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