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Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

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  • Thorsten Koeppl

    () (Department of Economics, Queen's University)

Abstract

Societies provide institutions that are costly to set up, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes resources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex-ante specified allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever commitment problems prevent first-best risk sharing, but never optimal to provide incentives exclusively via this technology. Commitment problems then persist and the optimal incentive structure changes dynamically over time with third-party enforcement monotonically increasing in the relative inequality between agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Thorsten Koeppl, 2005. "Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable," Working Papers 1050, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1050
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    File URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1050.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Latchezar Popov, 2014. "Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 195-222, September.
    2. Koppl, Thorsten V., 2006. "Risk sharing through financial markets with endogenous enforcement of trades," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1987-2014, November.
    3. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
    4. Jonathan Pogach, 2010. "Efficient Auditing and Enforcement in Dynamic Contracts," 2010 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Camera, Gabriele & Gioffré, Alessandro, 2014. "Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 51-63.
    6. Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco, 2015. "Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 105-119.
    7. Florin Bidian & Camelia Bejan, 2015. "Martingale properties of self-enforcing debt," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(1), pages 35-57, September.
    8. Ascari, Guido & Rankin, Neil, 2007. "Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 708-723, December.
    9. Thor Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2007. "The Poor, the Rich and the Enforcer: Institutional Choice and Growth," Working Papers 1150, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    10. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2013. "Consumer Default with Complete Markets: Default-based Pricing and Finite Punishment," Working Papers 711, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    11. Xiao, Tiaojun & Yang, Danqin, 2009. "Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(3), pages 1076-1085, August.
    12. Xavier Mateos-Planas & Giulio Seccia, 2014. "Consumer default with complete markets: default-based pricing and finite punishment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 549-583, August.
    13. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    14. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2014. "Efficient contract enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(1), pages 161-183, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Limited Commitment; Risk Sharing; Third-party Enforcement;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other

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