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Under-Insurance in Human Capital Models with Limited Enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Tom Krebs

    (University of Mannheim)

  • Moritz Kuhn

    (University of Bonn)

  • Mark Wright

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

Abstract

This paper uses a macroeconomic model calibrated to U.S data to show that limited contract enforcement leads to substantial under-insurance against human capital risk. The model economy is populated by a large number of risk-averse households who can invest in risk-free physical capital and risky human capital. Expected human capital returns are age-dependent and calibrated to match the observed life-cycle profile of median labor income. Households have access to a complete set of credit and insurance contracts, but their ability to use the available financial instruments is limited by the possibility of default (limited contract enforcement). According to the baseline calibration, young households are severely under-insured against human capital (labor income) risk and the welfare losses due to the lack of insurance are substantial. These results are robust to realistic variations in parameter values. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Tom Krebs & Moritz Kuhn & Mark Wright, 2017. "Under-Insurance in Human Capital Models with Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 25, pages 121-150, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:16-122
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2017.02.008
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    Cited by:

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    2. Moritz Kuhn, 2017. "The Research Agenda: Moritz Kuhn on Understanding income and wealth inequality," EconomicDynamics Newsletter, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(1), April.
    3. Angelopoulos, Konstantinos & Lazarakis, Spyridon & Malley, James, 2020. "The distributional implications of asymmetric income dynamics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    4. Alina K. Bartscher & Moritz Kuhn & Moritz Schularick & Ulrike I. Steins, 2020. "The Distribution of Household Debt in the United States, 1950-2019," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 015, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Human Capital Risk; Limited Enforcement; Insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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