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Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation

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  • ,

    (University of Rochester)

  • ,

    (SUNY Stony Brook)

Abstract

Alvarez and Jermann (2000) show that the constrained efficient allocations of endowment economies with imperfect risk sharing due to limited commitment can be decentralized as competitive equilibria with endogenous debt constraints that are not too tight. These are the loosest possible borrowing limits that do not allow for default in equilibrium. However, such a decentralization is not possible in the presence of capital accumulation, since changes in the aggregate capital also affect the incentives to default. In a model with endogenous production, aggregate risk, and competitive intermediaries, we show that a decentralization with endogenous debt constraints is possible if one also imposes an upper limit on the intermediaries’ capital holdings.

Suggested Citation

  • , & ,, 2006. "Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 439-459, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:204
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    Cited by:

    1. Krueger, Dirk & Perri, Fabrizio, 2011. "Public versus private risk sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 920-956, May.
    2. Yena Park, 2012. "Optimal Taxation in a Limited Commitment Economy," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    3. Bauducco, Sofia & Caprioli, Francesco, 2014. "Optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy with limited commitment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 302-315.
    4. Josef Schroth, 2012. "Financial Crisis Resolution," Staff Working Papers 12-42, Bank of Canada.
    5. Josef Schroth, 2016. "Optimal Intermediary Rents," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 98-118, January.
    6. Tom Krebs & Moritz Kuhn & Mark Wright, 2017. "Under-Insurance in Human Capital Models with Limited Enforcement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 25, pages 121-150, April.
    7. Yena Park, 2018. "Constrained Efficiency in a Human Capital Model," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 179-214, July.
    8. Karol Mazur, 2020. "Sharing Risk to Avoid Tragedy: Informal Insurance and Irrigation in Village Economies," CSAE Working Paper Series 2020-19, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Complete markets; enforcement constraints; intermediation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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