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Fiscal Decentralization and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe

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  • Makreshanska, Suzana
  • Petrevski, Goran

Abstract

Theoretical conceptions offer ambiguous suggestions about the precise sign of the association between decentralization and inflation (positive or negative). Given the different channels in which decentralization affects macroeconomic stability, this relationship becomes a matter of empirical research. This paper provides empirical evidence on the association between decentralization and inflation on a panel of 11 former transition economies from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the 1991-2011 period. The main findings from our empirical study suggest that decentralizing government activities in CEE countries is conducive with lower inflation rates. Also, we show that not only the extent of fiscal decentralization, but the composition of local revenue, too, matters for macroeconomic stability. Finally, we show that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and inflation is non-linear, i.e. initially, decentralization has favourable effects on macroeconomic stability, but above some threshold, these effects disappear. In these regards, the result from our study are consistent with several theoretical explanations: the commitment theory, the theory of continuity, and the theory of collective action.

Suggested Citation

  • Makreshanska, Suzana & Petrevski, Goran, 2015. "Fiscal Decentralization and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," MPRA Paper 77596, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Mar 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:77596
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    Keywords

    Fiscal Decentralization; Inflation; Central and Eastern Europe; Panel Data Models;

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance

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