IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cmk/journl/y2014p25-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization On Price Stability In The European Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Makreshanska Suzana

    (Ss Cyril & Methodius University, Republic of Macedonia)

  • Jovanovski Kiril

    (Ss Cyril & Methodius University, Republic of Macedonia)

Abstract

In this paper we examine the current state of knowledge in fiscal federalism literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and inflation and we conduct empirical research of the impact on decentralization on inflation rate in European countries. We estimate linear equation model using a panel data-set of 28 European countries over the period of 1972-2013. We also divide the whole sample in two subsamples: (1) Eurozone members until 2008: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Netherland, over the period 1979-2013; and (2) SEE countries non-euro zone members: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, over the period of 1996-2012. Additionally we have examined the influence of government revenues, budget deficits, economic development and openness of the country on price stability. In this paper, we find evidence that the fiscal decentralization has significant negative impact on inflation rate in European countries. For SEE countries we show that when decentralization is increasing from relatively low to medium level, it has positive impact on price stability, but after reaching the certain „optimal�oe degree of fiscal decentralization, further increasing of decentralization starts to have negative impact on price stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Makreshanska Suzana & Jovanovski Kiril, 2014. "Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization On Price Stability In The European Countries," Journal Articles, Center For Economic Analyses, pages 25-34, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cmk:journl:y:2014:p:25-34
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://journal.cea.org.mk/files/journals/1/articles/18/public/18-70-1-PB.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1997. "Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number rome97-1, June.
    4. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-1162, December.
    5. Jorge Martínez Vázquez & Robert M. McNab, 2006. "Fiscal decentralization, macrostability and growth," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 179(4), pages 25-49, September.
    6. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 837-857, December.
    7. Marta Campillo & Jeffrey A. Miron, 1997. "Why Does Inflation Differ across Countries?," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 335-362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Feltenstein, Andrew & Iwata, Shigeru, 2005. "Decentralization and macroeconomic performance in China: regional autonomy has its costs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 481-501, April.
    9. Dan Stegarescu, 2005. "Public sector decentralisation: measurement concepts and recent international trends," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 301-333, September.
    10. David Romer, 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 108(4), pages 869-903.
    11. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012. "Revenue decentralization and inflation: A re-evaluation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 298-300.
    12. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    13. Anwar Shah, 2007. "A Framework for Evaluating Alternate Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Equalization Transfers," Springer Books, in: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bob Searle (ed.), Fiscal Equalization, chapter 0, pages 141-162, Springer.
    14. King, David & Ma, Yue, 2001. "Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence, and inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 95-98, July.
    15. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    16. Neyapti, Bilin, 2004. "Fiscal decentralization, central bank independence and inflation: a panel investigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 227-230, February.
    17. Thornton, John, 2007. "Further evidence on revenue decentralization and inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 140-145, April.
    18. Evans, Richard W., 2012. "Is openness inflationary? Policy commitment and imperfect competition," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1095-1110.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Makreshanska, Suzana & Petrevski, Goran, 2015. "Fiscal Decentralization and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," MPRA Paper 77596, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Mar 2017.
    2. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012. "Revenue decentralization and inflation: A re-evaluation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 298-300.
    4. Posso, Alberto & Tawadros, George B., 2013. "Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 244-247.
    5. Iqbal, Nasir & Nawaz, Saima, 2010. "Fiscal Decentralization and Macroeconomic Stability: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan," MPRA Paper 27184, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Emna Trabelsi, 2022. "Macroprudential Transparency and Price Stability in Emerging and Developing Countries," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 11(1), pages 105-129.
    7. Murat Cetrez & Yasin Baris Altayligil, 2022. "The Role of Macroeconomic Stability in Current Account Balances," Istanbul Journal of Economics-Istanbul Iktisat Dergisi, Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 72(72-2), pages 569-597, December.
    8. Mazhar, Ummad & Jafri, Juvaria, 2014. "Does an informal sector reduce the economic dividends of political stability? Empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 60764, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob De Haan, 2010. "Inflation And Central Bank Independence: A Meta‐Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 593-621, September.
    10. Kenneth Scheve, 2003. "Public demand for low inflation," Bank of England working papers 172, Bank of England.
    11. Shahbaz, Muhammad & Loganathan, Nanthakumar & Mujahid, Nooreen & Ali, Amjad & Nawaz, Ahmed, 2015. "Determinants of Life Expectancy and its Prospects under the Role of Economic Misery: A Case of Pakistan," MPRA Paper 67167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Oct 2015.
    12. Dall’Orto Mas, Rodolfo & Vonessen, Benjamin & Fehlker, Christian & Arnold, Katrin, 2020. "The case for central bank independence: a review of key issues in the international debate," Occasional Paper Series 248, European Central Bank.
    13. Ftiti, Zied & Aguir, Abdelkader & Smida, Mounir, 2017. "Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 215-227.
    14. Jamus Jerome Lim, 2021. "The limits of central bank independence for inflation performance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 309-335, March.
    15. Mahir Binici & Yin-Wong Cheung & Kon S. Lai, 2011. "Trade Openness, Market Competition, and Inflation: Some Sectoral Evidence from OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 3690, CESifo.
    16. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    17. Hielscher, Kai & Markwardt, Gunther, 2012. "The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 286-301.
    18. Philip Bodman & Harry Campbell & Kelly-Ana Heaton & Andrew Hodge, "undated". "Fiscal Decentralisation, Macroeconomic Conditions and Economic Growth in Australia," MRG Discussion Paper Series 2609, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    19. Song Han & Casey B. Mulligan, 2008. "Inflation and the size of government," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 90(May), pages 245-267.
    20. Weymark, Diana N., 2007. "Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cmk:journl:y:2014:p:25-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marjan Nikolov (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaskmk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.