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A Framework for Evaluating Alternate Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Equalization Transfers

In: Fiscal Equalization

Author

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  • Anwar Shah

    (The World Bank)

Abstract

Fiscal equalizations programs are fairly common features of intergovernmental fiscal relations in industrial countries. Some developing countries have also recently introduced these programs and still others are contemplating such programs. Institutional arrangements for fiscal equalization vary across countries with wide variations in the form and membership of the relevant decision making bodies. For ease of analysis, these diverse arrangements can be broadly classified into five stylized models: (1) a central government ministry/agency; (2) independent agency (grants commission) reporting either to the executive or the legislature on a permanent or periodic basis; (3) intergovernmental forums including intergovernmental cum civil society forums: (4) national legislature; and (5) sub-national government forums. These arrangements have not yet received the attention that is due in view of their importance in creating a credible and stable fiscal transfers regime and only a handful of recent papers (Searle, 2004, Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2004) have documented these carries this work further by providing a simple neo-institutional economics framework for assessing alternative institutional arrangements for their impacts on simplicity, transparency and objectivity of the equalization program as well as transaction costs for various parties involved.

Suggested Citation

  • Anwar Shah, 2007. "A Framework for Evaluating Alternate Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Equalization Transfers," Springer Books, in: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Bob Searle (ed.), Fiscal Equalization, chapter 0, pages 141-162, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-48988-9_7
    DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-48988-9_7
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    Cited by:

    1. Tello, Mario D., 2010. "From national to local economic development: theoretical issues," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    2. Hansjörg Blöchliger & Claire Charbit, 2008. "Fiscal equalisation," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2008(1), pages 1-22.
    3. Qurat ul Ain & Tahir Yousaf & Yan Jie & Yasmeen Akhtar, 2020. "The Impact of Devolution on Government Size and Provision of Social Services: Evi¬dence from Pakistan," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 234(3), pages 105-135, September.
    4. World Bank & European Commission & Food and Agriculture Organization & United Nations Children’s Fund & United Nations Development Program & World Health Organization, 2007. "Angola : Public Expenditure Review, Volume 2. Sectoral Review," World Bank Publications - Reports 7648, The World Bank Group.
    5. Makreshanska Suzana & Jovanovski Kiril, 2014. "Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization On Price Stability In The European Countries," Journal Articles, Center For Economic Analyses, pages 25-34, December.
    6. Anwar Shah, 2006. "A Practitioner´s Guide to Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers," Revista de Economía y Estadística, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Instituto de Economía y Finanzas, vol. 0(2), pages 128-186, July.
    7. James Alm, 2015. "Financing Urban Infrastructure: Knowns, Unknowns, And A Way Forward," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 230-262, April.
    8. Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza & Nicolas Guadalupe Zuniga Espinoza, 2010. "Fiscal Transfers a Curse or Blessing? Evidence of Their Effect on Tax Effort for Municipalities in Sinaloa, Mexico," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1030, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

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