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Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund

Author

Listed:
  • Curzio Giannini
  • Mr. Carlo Cottarelli

Abstract

This paper argues that many developing countries may find it difficult to buttress disinflation programs purely through the adoption of traditional credibility-enhancing devices (such as monetary anchors and central bank independence), owing to “technical problems” (for example, high instability of money demand, increased capital mobility) and an insufficient endowment of credibility in the political institutions. In these cases, borrowing credibility from an outside agency like the International Monetary Fund may be the most effective solution. The paper discusses the different options that would allow the Fund to support programs aimed not at external adjustment—the Fund’s traditional role—but at disinflation.

Suggested Citation

  • Curzio Giannini & Mr. Carlo Cottarelli, 1998. "Inflation, Credibility, and the Role of the International Monetary Fund," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 1998/012, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfpdp:1998/012
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Milan Nikolic, 2002. "Russia and the IMF: Pseudo Lending for Pseudo Reforms," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 6, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    2. Jane Bogoev & Goran Petrevski & Bruno S. Sergi, 2012. "Investigating the Link Between Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 78-96, July.
    3. Makreshanska, Suzana & Petrevski, Goran, 2015. "Fiscal Decentralization and Inflation in Central and Eastern Europe," MPRA Paper 77596, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Mar 2017.
    4. Goran Petrevski & Jane Bogoev & Bruno Sergi, 2012. "The link between central bank independence and inflation in Central and Eastern Europe: are the results sensitive to endogeneity issue omitted dynamics and subjectivity bias?," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(4), pages 611-652.

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