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Coordination des Politiques Economiques au Sein de la Zone UEMOA : Bilan et Perspectives
[Economic Policy Coordination in the WAEMU: Results and Prospects]

Author

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  • COMBEY, Adama
  • NUBUKPO, Kako

Abstract

The recent economic and financial crisis in the euro area seems to question the theoretical solutions to coordinate economic policies in monetary unions. In this paper, we adress the current system of economic policy coordination within the WAEMU during 1994-2010. Using game theory and econometric techniques, we analyze the prospects of this framework. Thus, the effects of the coordination of the Central Bank and the WAEMU Commission on key macroeconomic variables are analyzed and the effects of fiscal policy coordination on intermediate goals including budget deficits and inflation. It appears that a mechanism for coordinating policies to strengthen the foundations for institutional convergence to support economic growth in the long term and that clearly specifies the set of monetary and fiscal contracts between on one side the monetary authority and fiscal authorities of the other, is a must for the optimality of the effects of monetary and fiscal policy item.

Suggested Citation

  • COMBEY, Adama & NUBUKPO, Kako, 2013. "Coordination des Politiques Economiques au Sein de la Zone UEMOA : Bilan et Perspectives
    [Economic Policy Coordination in the WAEMU: Results and Prospects]
    ," MPRA Paper 58118, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2014.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:58118
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58118/1/MPRA_paper_58118.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
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    3. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun, 2004. "Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(3), pages 431-456, November.
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    5. Patrick Villieu, 2003. "Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité du policy mix et coordination des politiques budgétaires en union monétaire," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 54(1), pages 25-46.
    6. Uhlig, H.F.H.V.S., 2002. "One Money, But Many Fiscal Policies in Europe : What are the Consequences?," Discussion Paper 2002-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    7. Buti, Marco & Franco, Daniele & Ongena, Hedwig, 1998. "Fiscal Discipline and Flexibility in EMU: The Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 81-97, Autumn.
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    11. Betty C. Daniel & Christos Shiamptanis, 2010. "Sovereign Default Risk in a Monetary Union," Working Papers 2010-3, Central Bank of Cyprus.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    policy coordination; monetary policy; fiscal policy; game theory; WAEMU;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • P11 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform

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