Marching to Different Drummers: Coordination and Independence in Monetary and Fiscal Policies
Most countries have recently experienced high fiscal deficits and real interest rates that depressed national saving and slowed economic growth. This study analyzes the reasons that underlie the skewed fiscal-monetary mix. The first section develops a game-theoretic model of fiscal and monetary coordination and shows that the macroeconomic outcomes depend upon the degree of coordination or independence. The second section applies this approach to the Clinton package by using three macroeconomic models to estimate the likely macroeconomic impacts of different degrees of coordination. The paper concludes that an uncoordinated policy may lead to substantial loss of output that will not be offset by higher potential output growth for many years. This implies that the potential gains from coordination are extremely high.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stephen K. McNees, 1986. "Modeling the Fed: a forward- looking monetary policy reaction function," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Nov, pages 3-8.
- Fair, Ray C, 1993. "Testing Macroeconomic Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 287-93, May.
- Robert S. Pindyck, 1976. "The Cost of Conflicting Objectives in Policy Formulation," NBER Chapters, in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 5, number 2, pages 239-248 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1067. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Glena Ames)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.