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Pacte de stabilité, crédibilité du policy mix et coordination des politiques budgétaires en union monétaire

  • Patrick Villieu

We construct a two countries model of a monetary union and explore credibility and cooperation problems in policy mix. Contractual solutions are considered. Delegation of monetary policy to an independent inflation adverse central banker may be counterproductive. To obtain the first best, a complete set of monetary and fiscal contracts must be designed. Furthermore, the optimal fiscal contracts are stat- contingent or, at least, linear-quadratic, two ways which appear too complex to be practicable. The stability Pact, which corresponds to a linear non state-contingent contract with an escape clause, may be viewed as a second best solution.Codification JEL : E5, H5, F4

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Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 54 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 25-46

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_541_0025
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