Workers' enterprises in the case of arts production
This paper shows that the standard result according to which labour-managed firms produce a lower amount of output, as compared to profit-maximising firms, is reversed if production per se gives utility and the workers’ membership of labour-managed firms is set prior to market decisions. Under the same hypotheses, the labour-managed firms set a higher product quality than the profit-oriented ones, ceteris paribus. The considered hypotheses are particularly relevant for the case of the performing arts sector, so that the presence of labour-managed firms should be particularly welcomed in this sector.
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