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Nash Bargaining And Co‐Operatives

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  • EDWARD OCZKOWSKI

Abstract

This paper develops the generalised Nash bargaining solution for a bargaining co‐operative selling its output to a single buyer. Three assumptions for co‐operative members’ behaviour are examined: profit maximisation, co‐operative surplus maximisation and maximising members’ price. Solutions are compared and comparative statics presented for these alternative assumptions and the bargaining over price and quantity transacted. The most striking feature of the results is that pursuing the objective of maximising members’ price does not necessarily lead to the highest members’ price

Suggested Citation

  • Edward Oczkowski, 2006. "Nash Bargaining And Co‐Operatives," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 89-98, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:45:y:2006:i:2:p:89-98
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8454.2006.00279.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8454.2006.00279.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    2. Iskow, Julie & Sexton, Richard, 1992. "Bargaining Associations in Grower-Processor Markets for Fruits and Vegetables," Research Reports 279811, United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Development.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cuccia, Tiziana & Cellini, Roberto, 2007. "Workers' enterprises in the case of arts production," MPRA Paper 5192, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Tiziana Cuccia & Roberto Cellini, 2009. "Workers' Enterprises And The Taste For Production: The Arts, Sport And Other Cases," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(1), pages 123-137, February.

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