Are Workers' Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional?
One of the reasons why workers' enterprises (WE) still represent a relevant chunk of the economy may lay in some affinities with conventional profit-maximizing firms. To provide a solid basis to this presumption, we compare the entry policies of WEs and conventional firms when size is set at entry and kept fixed afterwards. Even though short-run differences remain between WEs and conventional firms, a long-run coincidence appears in an uncertain dynamic environment. Endogenizing size and time of entry we see that the two kinds of firms enter at the same trigger market price and size. Both of them enter earlier and choose a dimension larger than the minimum efficient scale. This generalized coincidence may be another way to explain why WEs still make for an important share of the economy despite the ongoing mantra of their imminent demise. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 22 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma|
Phone: 0039 06 2040234
Fax: 0039 06 2020687
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1121-7081
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1121-7081|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roberto Cellini & Luca Lambertini, 2006.
"Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price,"
Review of Economic Design,
Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 233-248, December.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2004. "Workers' Enterprises Are Not Perverse: Differential Oligopoly Games with Sticky Price," Working Papers 531, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Steven R. Grenadier, 2002. "Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment Strategies of Firms," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 691-721.
- Fehr, Ernst & Sertel, Murat R., 1993. "Two forms of workers' enterprises facing imperfect labor markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 121-127.
- Sertel, Murat R., 1991. "Workers' enterprises in imperfect competition," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 698-710, December.
- Dixit, Avinash & Pindyck, Robert S & Sodal, Sigbjorn, 1999. "A Markup Interpretation of Optimal Investment Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 179-89, April.
- Martin CihÃ¡k & Heiko Hesse, 2007. "Cooperative Banks and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 07/2, International Monetary Fund.
- Robert McDonald & Daniel Siegel, 1986. "The Value of Waiting to Invest," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 707-727.
- John V. Leahy, 1993. "Investment in Competitive Equilibrium: The Optimality of Myopic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(4), pages 1105-1133.
- Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-105, December.
- Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, .
"Start-up entry strategies: Employer vs. Nonemployer firms,"
ubs0409, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
- Michele Moretto & Gianpaolo Rossini, 2005. "Start-up Entry Strategies: Employer vs. Nonemployer firms," Working Papers 2005.13, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Pestieau, P. & Thisse, J. -F., 1979. "On market imperfections and labor management," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 353-356.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:labour:v:22:y:2008:i:2:p:369-381. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.