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Lo sviluppo delle competenze nei contesti precari
[Skills development in precariousness: the dark side of flexibility?]

Author

Listed:
  • Ferrari, Filippo

Abstract

The article explores the relationship between flexibility and skills development: the initial hypothesis was that precariousness and flexibility had a negative correlation with the opportunity to develop professional skills. Rather surprisingly, in Italy it seems that being employed on contracts known as 'atypical' or fixed-term does not have a significant impact on participation in training activities, unlike other Western countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferrari, Filippo, 2011. "Lo sviluppo delle competenze nei contesti precari
    [Skills development in precariousness: the dark side of flexibility?]
    ," MPRA Paper 33284, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33284
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33284/1/MPRA_paper_33284.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    skills; fixed-term contracts; flexibility;

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training

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