The Effect of Temporary Contracts on Human Capital Accumulation in Chile
This paper studies the probability of receiving employer-paid training and other training independent of who finances it for permanent and temporary workers in Chile. The authors use data from the Social Protection Survey, EPS, allowing them to construct a panel of workers with information from 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009. The results suggest that having a temporary contract in Chile reduces the probability of receiving employer-paid training. The survey also finds that this deficit is not compensated by other types of training. This finding is important for two reasons. First, the proportion of temporary workers that obtain an open-ended contract is low. Second, the productivity growth in Chile after 1997 is practically zero and human capital accumulation is one of the factors that might help to recover the path of productivity growth.
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