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Lyapunov Stability in an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market


  • Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo


In this paper the existence and stability of equilibria in an evolutionary game theory model of the labor market is studied by using the Lyapunov method. The model display multiple equilibria and it is shown that the Nash Equilibria of the static game are evolutionary stable equilibria in the game theory evolutionary set up. In this vein a complete characterization of the dynamics of an evolutionary model of the labor market is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo, 2011. "Lyapunov Stability in an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market," MPRA Paper 29957, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29957

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Evolutionary game theory approach; labour market; informal economy; Lyapunov function;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand

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