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Workers behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach

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Abstract

This article investigates the co-evolution of labor relationships and workers preferences. According to recent experimental economics findinggs on social preferences, the workforce is assumed to be heterogeneous. It is composed by both cooperative and non-cooperative workers. In addition, firms differ by the type of contract they offer (explicit or implicit). Finally, both the distribution of preferences and the degree of contractual completeness are endogeneized. Preferences evolve through a process of cultural transmission and the proportion of implicit contracts is driven by an evolutionary process. The complementarity between the transmission of cooperation and the implementation of implicit contracts leads to multiple equilibria which allow for path-dependence. This property is illustrated by the evolutions of American and Japanese labor contracts during the Twentieth century

Suggested Citation

  • Victor Hiller, 2008. "Workers behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne v08028, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:v08028
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2009.04064.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Ricardo Azevedo Araujo & Helmar Nunes Moreira, 2014. "Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 15(1), pages 41-53.
    2. Gregory Ponthiere, 2011. "Mortality, Family and Lifestyles," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 175-190, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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