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An Empirical Analysis on Board Monitoring Role and Loan Portfolio Quality Measurement in Banks

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  • Stefanelli, Valeria
  • Matteo, Cotugno

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of the board monitoring role on specific loan portfolio quality measures in banks (default rate, recovery rate and provisioning rate). We use a sample comprises a totality of Italian-based banks, listed at Borsa Italiana SpA in 2006-2008 and a number of accounting proxies to express the loan portfolio quality of a bank. The results of the analysis show an overall weakness of the board role (expressed by Independents and Audit Committee on board) in monitoring loan portfolio quality of the bank, with the subsequent damage of the interests of stakeholders. A positive contribution of board monitoring, even if partial, is highlighted in two cases: Independents seems improve recovery rate, while the Audit committee enhances provisioning rate in banks. With reference to default rate, a total negative effect of board monitoring is reported. On the base of these results, some managerial implications are proposed.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefanelli, Valeria & Matteo, Cotugno, 2010. "An Empirical Analysis on Board Monitoring Role and Loan Portfolio Quality Measurement in Banks," MPRA Paper 29766, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29766
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    Cited by:

    1. Vasiliki MAKRI & Konstantinos PAPADATOS, 2016. "Determinants Of Loan Quality: Lessons From Greek Cooperative Banks," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 17, pages 115-140, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks; Corporate governance; Board of directors; Loan Portfolio Quality;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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