Does faster loan growth lead to higher loan losses?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Kausar Hamdani & Anthony P. Rodrigues & Maria Varvatsoulis, 1994. "Survey evidence on credit tightening and the factors behind the recent credit crunch," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, number 1994seoctatfbtrc.
- Williamson, Stephen D., 1986.
"Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-179, September.
- Stephen D. Williamson, 1984. "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Working Paper 583, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- John A. Weinberg, 1995. "Cycles in lending standards?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 1-18.
- Raymond E. Owens & Stacey L. Schreft, 1991.
"Survey evidence of tighter credit conditions: what does it mean?,"
Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 77(Mar), pages 29-34.
- Raymond E. Owens & Stacey L. Schreft, 1991. "Survey evidence of tighter credit conditions: what does it mean?," Working Paper 91-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Asea, Patrick K. & Blomberg, Brock, 1998.
"Lending cycles,"
Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1-2), pages 89-128.
- Asea, P.K. & Blomberg, S.B., 1997. "Lending Cycles," Papers 97-01, Wellesley College - Department of Economics.
- Patrick K. Asea & S. Brock Blomberg, 1997. "Lending Cycles," NBER Working Papers 5951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Patrick Asea & S. Brook Blomberg, 1997. "Lending Cycles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 764, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ravn, Søren Hove, 2016. "Endogenous credit standards and aggregate fluctuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 89-111.
- G. B. Gorton & Ping He, 2008.
"Bank Credit Cycles,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(4), pages 1181-1214.
- Gary Gorton & Ping He, 2005. "Bank Credit Cycles," NBER Working Papers 11363, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kenneth A. Froot & Jeremy C. Stein, 1991.
"Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An Imperfect Capital Markets Approach,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1191-1217.
- Kenneth A. Froot & Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An Imperfect Capital Markets Approach," NBER Working Papers 2914, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Suarez, Javier & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio, 2018. "Approaching non-performing loans from a macroprudential angle," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 7, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Andrea Orame, 2020. "The role of bank supply in the Italian credit market: evidence from a new regional survey," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1279, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Basab Dasupta, 2005. "Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Informal Credit Markets: A Comparative Analysis Between Credit Rationing and Self-Revelation Regimes," Working papers 2005-18, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Wim Suyker, 2008. "The credit crisis and the Dutch economy... in eight frequently asked questions," CPB Memorandum 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-Francois Tremblay, 2015.
"Cash-flow business taxation revisited: bankruptcy, risk aversion and asymmetric information,"
Working Papers
1531, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
- Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato & Jean-François Tremblay, 2017. "Cash-Flow Business Taxation Revisited: Bankruptcy, Risk Aversion and Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 1713E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Robin Boadway & Jean-Francois Tremblay & Motohiro Sato, 2016. "Cash-flow Business Taxation Revisited: Bankruptcy, Risk Aversion And Asymmetric Information," Working Paper 1372, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Alejandro Jara & Carmen Gloria Silva, 2007. "Metodología de la Encuesta sobre Condiciones Generales y Estándares en el Mercado de Crédito Bancario," Economic Statistics Series 57, Central Bank of Chile.
- Zabavnik, Darja & Verbič, Miroslav, 2024. "Unravelling the credit market shocks and investment dynamics: A theoretical and empirical perspective," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
- Hyytinen, Ari, 2003. "Information production and lending market competition," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 233-253.
- Gerhard Clemenz & Mona Ritthaler, 1992. "Credit markets with asymmetric information : a survey," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 12-26, Spring.
- Carton, Christine & Ronquillo, Cely, 2008. "Determinantes del crecimiento económico e intermediación bancaria: un análisis empírico para países latinoamericanos [Determinants of economic growth and bank intermediation: empirical analysis for," MPRA Paper 15514, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Nov 2008.
- Berger, Allen N. & Espinosa-Vega, Marco A. & Frame, W. Scott & Miller, Nathan H., 2011.
"Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
- Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Hakenes, Hendrik, 2004.
"Banks as delegated risk managers,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 2399-2426, October.
- Hakenes, Hendrik, 2003. "Banks as Delegated Risk Managers," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-13, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Samuel Fosu & Albert Danso & Henry Agyei-Boapeah & Collins G. Ntim & Emmanuel Adegbite, 2020. "Credit information sharing and loan default in developing countries: the moderating effect of banking market concentration and national governance quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 55-103, July.
- Allen Blackman, 2001.
"Why don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 1024-1035.
- Blackman, Allen, 2001. "Why Don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?," Discussion Papers 10886, Resources for the Future.
- Blackman, Allen, 2001. "Why Don't Lenders Finance High-Return Technological Change in Developing-Country Agriculture?," RFF Working Paper Series dp-01-17, Resources for the Future.
- Cieply Sylvie, 2001. "The Radical Change of French Firms’ Financial Characteristics. Macroeconomic Consequences and Lessons for Political Economics / Die französische Finanzrevolution. Die Folgen für die Finanzstruktur der," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(5-6), pages 556-576, October.
- Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedker:y:1999:i:qii:p:57-75:n:v.84no.2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kira Lillard (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbkcus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedker/y1999iqiip57-75nv.84no.2.html