Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications
This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level.
|Date of creation:||27 Nov 2008|
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- Geoffron, Patrice & Wang, Haobo, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/79, Paris Dauphine University.
- Ralf Dewenter & Justus Haucap, 2005. "The Effects of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates for Asymmetric Networks," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 185-197, September.
- Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
- Edmond Baranes & Cuong Vuong, 2012. "Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 204-222, October.
- Patrice Geoffron & Haobo Wang, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 58-79.
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