Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications
This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination where one of the networks has a relative advantage. We investigate profit-maximizing network pricing behaviour, in particular competitively chosen, non-cooperative access prices at potentially asymmetric market equilibria.
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- repec:dau:papers:123456789/11246 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001.
"Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000. "Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 739, The University of Melbourne.
- Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Patrice Geoffron & Haobo Wang, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 58-79.
- Dessein, Wouter, 2003.
" Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing,"
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The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 593-611, Winter.
- Ralf Dewenter & Justus Haucap, 2005. "The Effects of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates for Asymmetric Networks," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 185-197, September.
- Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages F270-F307, 06.
- Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
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