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Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications

  • Stefan Behringer

    ()

    (Economics Department, Frankfurt University)

This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination where one of the networks has a relative advantage. We investigate profit-maximizing network pricing behaviour, in particular competitively chosen, non-cooperative access prices at potentially asymmetric market equilibria.

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Paper provided by JEPS in its series JEPS Working Papers with number 06-005.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:06005
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://jeps.repec.org/

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Vuong, 2012. "Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 204-222, October.
  3. Hoernig, Steffen, 2006. "On-Net and Off-Net Pricing on Asymmetric Telecommunications Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11246 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Ralf Dewenter & Justus Haucap, 2005. "The Effects of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates for Asymmetric Networks," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 185-197, September.
  6. Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001. "Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
  7. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages F270-F307, 06.
  8. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
  9. Behringer, Stefan, 2009. "Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 185-188, March.
  10. repec:dau:papers:123456789/79 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
  12. Wouter Dessein, 2000. "Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-22, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  13. Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination Revisited," TSE Working Papers 10-198, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2010.
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Wright, Julian, 2007. "Mobile call termination in the UK," MPRA Paper 2344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Patrice Geoffron & Haobo Wang, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 58-79.
  16. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
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