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Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Behringer

    (Economics Department, Frankfurt University)

Abstract

This paper looks at competition in the telecommunication industry. We determine the equilibrium pricing parameters for a duopoly situation with a particular emphasis on the role of competitively chosen non-reciprocal access prices. In the symmetric equilibrium the networks optimally choose positive access charge markups which reconciles empirical observation with the theoretical economics literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
  • Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:05002
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-564, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
    2. Behringer, Stefan, 2009. "Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 185-188, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunications; access pricing;

    JEL classification:

    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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