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Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Stefan Behringer

    () (Economics Department, Frankfurt University)

Abstract

This paper looks at the effects of entry on welfare in the telecommunication industry. The equilibrium pricing parameters for an incumbent (state) monopoly and for a duopoly situation are determined in which access charges are chosen non-reciprocally. A welfare comparison between the monopoly and duopoly equilibrium situation is undertaken and the welfare consequences of alternative access pricing regimes are investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-003, JEPS.
  • Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:05003
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
    2. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
    3. Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003. "Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 205-213, November.
    4. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-564, May.
    5. Armstrong, Mark & Wright, Julian, 2007. "Mobile call termination in the UK," MPRA Paper 2344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. repec:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:3:p:413-42 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
    9. Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001. "Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
    10. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Edmond Baranes & Stefan Behringer & Jean-Christophe Poudou, 2017. "Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 127, pages 33-60.
    2. Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
    3. Baranes, Edmond & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2010. "Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 172-176, March.
    4. Ahmet Özçam, 2012. "The Public Policy Implications of the Persistence of a Monopoly Versus a Duopolistic Market," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 67-79.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunications; access pricing;

    JEL classification:

    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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