Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry
This paper looks at the effects of entry on welfare in the telecommunication industry. The equilibrium pricing parameters for an incumbent (state) monopoly and for a duopoly situation are determined in which access charges are chosen non-reciprocally. A welfare comparison between the monopoly and duopoly equilibrium situation is undertaken and the welfare consequences of alternative access pricing regimes are investigated.
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- Stefan Behringer, 2006.
"Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications,"
JEPS Working Papers
- Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
- Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," MPRA Paper 11795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
- repec:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:3:p:413-42 is not listed on IDEAS
- Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
- Armstrong, Mark & Wright, Julian, 2007. "Mobile call termination in the UK," MPRA Paper 2344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003. "Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 205-213, November.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
- Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000.
"Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
739, The University of Melbourne.
- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001. "Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
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