Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly
This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion.
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- Rothschild, R., 1992. "On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 33-37, September.
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- Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
- David R. Collie, 2006. "Collusion in Differentiated Duopolies with Quadratic Costs," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 151-159, 04.
- Berger, Ulrich, 2005. "Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 107-112, January.
- Klemperer, Paul D, 1987. "Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388a), pages 99-117, Supplemen.
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