Price or Quantity in Tacit Collusion?
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Stefano Colombo, 2016. "Mixed oligopolies and collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 167-184, June.
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More about this item
KeywordsPartial collusion; product differentiation;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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