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Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Edmond Baranes

    (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université de Montpellier, Labex Entreprendre - UM - Université de Montpellier)

  • Jean-Christophe Poudou

    (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université de Montpellier, Labex Entreprendre - UM - Université de Montpellier)

  • Stefan Behringer

    (Mercator School of Management - Universität Duisburg-Essen = University of Duisburg-Essen [Essen])

Abstract

This paper considers collusion between asymmetric networks in the telecommunications industry. Its primary purpose is to fill the gap between the literature on collusion between asymmetric firms and the literature on collusion in the telecommunications industry. Employing the standard Hotelling framework of horizontal product differentiation with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination we allow for differentiation in a second dimension. Modulo locations, the subscribers to each network operator face an asymmetry parameter that directly impacts their demands and can capture asymmetries in demand elasticities, in demand size, or even both. The implications of these asymmetries for the possibility of sustaining collusion are investigated under alternative access pricing regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmond Baranes & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Stefan Behringer, 2017. "Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry," Post-Print hal-01671737, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01671737
    DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.127.0033
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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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