Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry
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- Edmond Baranes & Stefan Behringer & Jean-Christophe Poudou, 2015. "Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry," Working Papers 15-13, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2015.
- Edmond Baranes & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Stefan Behringer, 2017. "Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry," Post-Print hal-01671737, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsCollusion; Mobile Termination Rates; Network Asymmetries; Glide Path;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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