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Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections


  • Richard van Weelden


We study an elections model in which political parties are internally divided betweenan “elite†and a “base†whose preferences are imperfectly aligned. Elites are better informedabout the quality of potential nominees, and their endorsements can identify andpromote high quality candidates. However, elites may also choose to restrict their endorsementsto candidates who adopt their preferred policies. We introduce a threat ofentry from outsider candidates, who have the prominence and resources to bypass partyelites. We consider when voters will turn to an outsider candidate, and identify the conditionsunder which an outsider challenge will come in the primary as opposed to as athird-party candidacy. We further explore when this threat disciplines elite endorsementsand the conditions under which outsider challenges are most likely to succeed.

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  • Richard van Weelden, 2017. "Crashing the Party? Elites, Outsiders, and Elections," Working Paper 6327, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
  • Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:6327

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:113:y:2019:i:01:p:282-286_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Eguia, Jon X. & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2019. "Tactical Extremism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(01), pages 282-286, February.
    3. Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2018. "Why do voters elect less qualified candidates?," MPRA Paper 89215, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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