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Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will

Author

Listed:
  • Benoit S. Y. Crutzen
  • Dana Sisak
  • Otto H. Swank

Abstract

Populists are often anti-elitist and advocate for popular will over expertise. We show that these two populist characteristics are responses to mainstream parties leaving behind the majority of voters, the common people. Our model highlights two forces behind electoral success: numbers, which favor the common people, and knowledge, which favors the elite. Electoral competition may lead parties to cater to the elite. We identify conditions under which an elite bias encourages entry with an anti-elite platform. Finally, we identify conditions under which parties follow the common people's opinion when that group would benefit from parties relying on experts.

Suggested Citation

  • Benoit S. Y. Crutzen & Dana Sisak & Otto H. Swank, 2024. "Left Behind Voters, Anti-Elitism and Popular Will," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 19(2), pages 127-156, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00022027
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00022027
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2023. "Drain the Swamp: A Theory of Anti-Elite Populism," Discussion Papers 2023-02, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    3. repec:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp23204 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Massimo Morelli & Antonio Nicolò & Paolo Roberti, 2021. "A Commitment Theory of Populism," CESifo Working Paper Series 9473, CESifo.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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