Matching with Contracts: An Efficient Marriage Market?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
- Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2007. "Price discrimination and efficient matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 243-263, February.
More about this item
KeywordsMatching; two-sided information asymmetry; endogenous sharing rule; marriage market; stochastic marital surplus;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-02-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DEM-2013-02-03 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-02-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-03 (Microeconomics)
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