Linking Appropriation of Common Resources and Provision of Public Goods Decreases Rate of Destruction of the Commons
Experimental studies of common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas are frequently terminated with collapse of the resource; however, there is considerable evidence in real-world settings that challenge this finding. To reconcile this difference, we propose a two-stage model that links appropriation of the CPR and provision of public goods in an attempt to explain the emergence of cooperation in the management of CPRs under environmental uncertainty. Benchmark predictions are derived from the model, and subsequently tested experimentally under different marginal cost-benefit structures concerning the voluntary contribution to the provision of the good. Our results suggest that the severity of the appropriation problem is significantly mitigated by the presence of an option for voluntarily contributing a fraction of the income surplus from the appropriation phase to the provision of the public good.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: NIMA, EEG - Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal|
Phone: +351 253601930
Fax: +351 253601380
Web page: http://nima.eeg.uminho.pt/
|Order Information:|| Postal: NIMA, EEG - Universidade do Minho, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal|
Web: http://nima.eeg.uminho.pt/ Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Walker, James M, et al, 2000. "Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 212-234, January.
- James Andreoni, 1995.
"Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-21.
- Andreoni, J., 1994. "Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Farming on Cooperation in Experiments," Working papers 9406, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- James Andreoni, 1994. "Warm-Glow versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments," Experimental 9410002, EconWPA.
- James Andreoni, 1997. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effect of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671, David K. Levine.
- Charles N. Noussair & Charles R. Plott & Raymond G. Riezman, 2013. "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 17, pages 299-328 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Noussair, Charles N & Plott, Charles R & Riezman, Raymond G, 1995. "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 462-491, June.
- Noussair, Charles & Plott, Charles & Riezman, Raymond., "undated". "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," Working Papers 799, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
- John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
- J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
- Villena, Mauricio G. & Zecchetto, Franco, 2011. "Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 330-347, June.
- Villena, Mauricio G. & Zecchetto, Franco, 2010. "Subject-specific Performance Information can worsen the Tragedy of the Commons: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 27783, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Dec 2010.
- R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
- R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010. "Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism," Levine's Working Paper Archive 310, David K. Levine.
- Herr, Andrew & Gardner, Roy & Walker, James M., 1997. "An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 77-96, April.
- Anya C. Savikhin & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Simultaneous Decision-Making In Competitive And Cooperative Environments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1311-1323, 04.
- Anya Savikhin & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments," Working Papers 10-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Savikhin, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2012. "Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments," MPRA Paper 46809, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Anya Samek & Roman Sheremeta, 2012. "Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00426, The Field Experiments Website.
- Tatsuyoshi, S. & Nakamura, H., 1995. "The 'Spite' Dilema in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 0370, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Berkes, Fikret, 1986. "Local-level management and the commons problem , : A comparative study of Turkish coastal fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 215-229, July. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nim:nimawp:50/2013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (NIMA)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.