Micro-foundations of Congestion and Pricing: A Game Theory Perspective
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- Levinson, David, 2005. "Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 691-704.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Ieromonachou, Petros & Warren, James, 2008. "Policy Packages as potential routes to urban road pricing in the UK," European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, ISTIEE, Institute for the Study of Transport within the European Economic Integration, issue 40, pages 106-123.
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- repec:eee:jotrge:v:31:y:2013:i:c:p:296-308 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hugo Emilio Silva & Robin Lindsey & André de Palma & Vincent A.C. van den Berg, 2014.
"On the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Bottleneck Model with Atomic Users,"
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- Holguín-Veras, José, 2011. "Urban delivery industry response to cordon pricing, time-distance pricing, and carrier-receiver policies in competitive markets," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 45(8), pages 802-824, October.
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More about this item
KeywordsGame Theory; Congestion; Queueing; Traffic Flow; Congestion Pricing; Road Pricing; Value Pricing .;
- R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
- R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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