IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Revenue Choice on a Serial Network

Listed author(s):
  • David Levinson


    (Nexus (Networks, Economics, and Urban Systems) Research Group, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Minnesota)

A model to examine the choice by jurisdiction whether to finance roads with taxes or tolls is developed. The idea of decentralized, local control and multiple jurisdictions distinguishes this analysis from one where a central authority maximizes global welfare. Key factors posited to explain the choice include the length of trips using the roads, the size of the governing jurisdiction, the elasticity of demand to revenue instruments, and the transaction costs of collection - which dictate the size and scope of the free rider problem associated with financing. Spatial complexity in this problem results from the fact that jurisdiction residents use both local and non-local networks, and each jurisdiction's network is used by both local and non-local residents. The central thesis argues that, since jurisdictions try to do well by their residents who are both voters and travelers, the effects of a revenue instrument on local residents is a key consideration in the choice of that revenue instrument. Decentralization of control and lower toll collection costs are identified as conditions under which tolls would more likely become the preferred revenue instrument for highways. .

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
File Function: First version, 2007
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group in its series Working Papers with number 200001.

in new window

Date of creation: 2000
Publication status: Published in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 34,1: 69-98
Handle: RePEc:nex:wpaper:serial
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Dept. of Civil Engineering, 500 Pillsbury Drive SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455

Phone: +01 (612) 625-6354
Fax: +01 (612) 626-7750
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nex:wpaper:serial. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Levinson)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.