A Multi-Agent Congestion and Pricing Model
A multi-agent model of travelers competing to utilize a roadway in time and space is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of congestion and pricing on traveler behaviors and network equilibrium. To realize the spillover effect among travelers, N-player games are constructed in which the strategy set include (N+1) strategies. We solve the discrete N-player game (for N less than 8) and find Nash equilibria if they exist. This model is compared to the bottleneck model. The results of numerical simulation show that the two models yield identical results in terms of lowest total costs and marginal costs when a social optimum exists.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Publication status:||Published in Transportmetrica Vol.2, No.3, 2006 pp.237-249.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Dept. of Civil Engineering, 500 Pillsbury Drive SE, Minneapolis, MN 55455|
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- David Levinson, 2005.
"Micro-foundations of Congestion and Pricing: A Game Theory Perspective,"
200504, University of Minnesota: Nexus Research Group.
- Levinson, David, 2005. "Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 691-704.
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